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Abstract We proposed a framework of quantum-enhanced logic-based blockchain,
which improves the efficiency and power of quantum-secured blockchain. The
efficiency is improved by using a new quantum honest-success Byzantine agree-
ment protocol to replace the classical Byzantine agreement protocol, while
the power is improved by incorporating quantum protection and quantum
certificate into the syntax of transactions. Our quantum-secured logic-based
blockchain can already be implemented by the current technology. The cryp-
tocurrency created and transferred in our blockchain is called qulogicoin. Incor-
porating quantum protection and quantum certificates into blockchain makes
it possible to use blockchain to overcome the limitations of some quantum
cryptographic protocols. As an illustration, we show that a significant short-
coming of cheat-sensitive quantum bit commitment protocols can be overcome
with the help of our blockchain and qulogicoin.
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1 Introduction
A blockchain is a distributed ledger which enables achieving consensus in a
large decentralized network of agents who do not trust each other. It is a
ledger in the sense that data stored on a blockchain is transactions like “Al-
ice sends 1 bitcoin to Bob”. It is distributed in the sense that every miners
(the agents who are in charge of updating the ledger) has a same copy of the
database. One of the most prominent application of blockchains is cryptocur-
rencies, such as Bitcoin [26]. Another important application of blockchains is
the implementation of self-executable smart contracts [32].
This is the first paper of our project on quantum-enhanced logic-based
blockchain (QLB). The ultimate goal of our project is to design a framework
of blockchain which has the following advantages over the existing classical
and quantum blockchains:
1. More efficient.
2. More powerful.
3. More Secure.
4. Cheaper.
5. Smarter.
6. Easier-to-regulate.
In this paper we will use quantum technology to achieve efficiency, powerful-
ness, security and cheapness. In the future, we will use techniques from logic
to achieve smartness and regulatability.
Our starting point in this paper is the quantum-secured blockchain (QB)
developed by Kiktenko et al. [19]. Due to the application of quantum tech-
nologies, QB is more secure than classical blockchain in the sense that QB
is immune from attacks of quantum computers, while classical blockchain is
not. QB is probably also more efficient and (will be) cheaper than classi-
cal blockchain due to the omission of the costly and time-consuming proof-
of-work. The security and cheapness of our QLB is inherited from QB. To
achieve higher effiency, we will develop a new quantum Byzantine agreement
(QBA) protocol to replace the classical Byzantine agreement protocol in QB.
To make our blockchain more powerful, we will embed quantum protection and
quantum certificate into the syntax of transactions in QLB. Those generalized
transactions endow more power to QLB than QB and classical blockchain in
the sense that QLB is able to handle contracts which involve tests of some
quantum properties. As an illustration, we will show that a significant short-
coming of cheat-sensitive quantum bit commitment protocols can be overcome
with the help of QLB, while classical blockchain and QB is unhelpful in this
case.
The main contribution of this paper is the following:
1. We introduce QLB and demonstrate that it is more efficient and powerful
than QB. Just like QB, QLB is also implementable by the current technol-
ogy.
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2. Based on QLB, a new cryptocurrency called qulogicoin is introduced.
3. Our QBA protocol is simpler and easier to be implemented than most QBA
protocols in the literature.
4. We discover a significant problem of quantum bit commitment and solve
it. This problem is overlooked for many years.
The structure of this paper is as follows. We present an overview of QLB in
Section 2. Then in Section 3 we introduce a new QBA protocol to improve the
efficiency of QLB. In Section 4 we demonstrate the power of QLB by solving
a problem in quantum bit commitment. We draw conclusions in Section 5.
2 Overview of quantum-enhanced logic-based blockchain
The structure of QLB is similar to the structure of QB [19]. We assume each
pair of nodes (agents), of which at least a half of them are honest, is connected
by an authenticated quantum channel and a not necessary authenticated clas-
sical channel. Each pair of agents can establish a sequence of secret keys by
using quantum key distribution [8]. Those keys will later be used for message
authentication.
New transactions are created by those nodes who wish to transfer their
cryptocurrency to another node. Each new transaction must contain the in-
formation about the Hash value, the receiver and the previous transaction from
which the cryptocurrency is redeemed. Formally, a plain transaction Tx saying
that “i sends the qulogicoins, which i has received from another transaction
Ty, to j” is of the form
Tx = (x, y, j).
Here x is the Hash value of this transaction. A Hash function is a one-way
function which maps an arbitrary length string to a fixed-length string. Just
like in QB [19], we use Toeplitz hashing [20,21], of which the core component
Toeplitz matrix is generated by the secret keys distributed via the quantum
channel previously. Formally, x = TS(y, j)⊕ r, where S and r are secret keys
and TS is the Toeplitz matrix generated by S. TS() maps a string to another
string of which the length is the same as the length of r. ⊕ is the exclusive-or
operator.
A protected transaction Tx saying that “ i sends the qulogicoins, which i
has received from another transaction Ty, to j; The qulogicoins transferred in
this transaction can only be used when both α and φ is true” is of the form
Tx = (x, y, j;α, φ).
Here α is a boolean function about the classical certificate and φ is a boolean
function about the quantum certificate to be introduced soon.1 We let x =
TS(y, j;α, φ)⊕ r.
A more general form of a transaction is an extension of a protected trans-
action with some classical and quantum certificates.
1 In the future, we will use logical formulas to express α and φ.
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Tx = (x, y, j;α, φ;β, ψ).
Here β is some classical data and ψ is some quantum data, which are considered
as certificates. We let x = TS(y, j;α, φ;β)⊕ r. The functionality of certificates
is to satisfy the protection condition of the the transaction Ty. An even more
general form which involves more than 1 redeemed transaction y1, . . . , yn can
be defined as
Tx = (x, y1, . . . , yn, j;α, φ;β1, ψ1, . . . , βn, ψn).
where βi, ψi are the classical and quantum certificates for Tyi and x = TS(y1, . . . ,
yn, j;α, φ;β1, . . . βn)⊕ r.
A general transaction, except its quantum certificate, is then sent via
classical channels to all miners, while the quantum certificate is sent via
quantum channels. Each miner checks the consistency of the new transac-
tion with respect to their local copy of the ledger and forms an opinion re-
garding the transaction’s admissibility. Here consistency checking for Tx =
(x, y1, . . . , yn, j;α, φ;β1, ψ1, . . . , βn, ψn) means to check the following:
1. Message authentication: check if x = TS(y1, . . . , yn, j;α, φ;β1, . . . βn) ⊕ r,
where S and r is taken from the secret keys shared between the miner and
the sender.
2. check if the sender is the receiver of Ty1 , . . . Tyn .
3. check if Tyi has been redeemed before this transaction, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
4. check if βi satisfies αyi , where αyi is the classical protection of Tyi .
5. check if ψi satisfies φyi , where φyi is the quantum protection of Tyi.
Then all the miners apply the honest-success quantum Byzantine agreement
protocol, which we will introduce in Section 3, to the new transaction, arriving
at a consensus regarding the correct version of that transaction and whether
the transaction is admissible. The double-spending events (a dishonest agent
sending different versions of a particular transaction to different nodes of the
network) is excluded in this stage. Finally, the transaction is added to the
ledger of every node if at least a half of the miners agree that the transaction
to be admissible.
We will explain in the next section that some miners, as well as some spe-
cial agents called list distributors, are rewarded in the procedure of achieving
consensus. This is the only way to generate new cryptocurrency (qulogicoin)
in our blockchain.
3 Quantum honest-success Byzantine agreement
The Byzantine agreement protocol is the solution to the Byzantine generals
problem [29,22]:
Three generals of the Byzantine army want to decide upon a common plan of
action: either to attack (0) or to retreat (1). They can only communicate in
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pairs by sending messages. However, one of the generals might be a traitor,
trying to keep the loyal generals from agreeing on a plan. How to find a way
in which all loyal generals follow the same plan?
Definition 1 (Byzantine agreement (BA) protocol [14]) A protocol
among n agents such that one distinct agent S (the sender) holds an input
value xs ∈ D (for some finite domain D) and all other agents (the receivers)
eventually decide on an output value in D is said to achieve Byzantine agree-
ment if the protocol guarantees that all honest agents decide on the same
output value y ∈ D and that y = xs whenever the sender is honest.
In QB [19], the authors use classical Byzantine agreement protocol [29] to
update the distributed ledger. They noticed that a shortcoming of the classi-
cal Byzantine agreement protocol [29] is that it becomes exponentially data-
intensive if a large number of cheating nodes are present. Therefore further
research on developing an efficient consensus protocol is required.
In the literature of quantum computing, several Byzantine agreement pro-
tocols has been studied in the past decade [14,17,7,15,33]. In the setting of
QLB, we need a Byzantine agreement protocol to solve the double-spending
problem. It turns out that the following weak notion of Byzantine agreement
is already sufficient for our purpose.
Definition 2 (honest-success Byzantine agreement protocol (HBA))
A protocol among n agents such that one distinct agent S (the sender) holds
an input value xs ∈ D (for some finite domain D) and all other agents (the
receivers) eventually decide on an output value in D is said to achieve honest-
success Byzantine agreement if the protocol guarantees the following:
1. If the sender is honest, then all honest agents decide on the same output
value y = xs.
2. If the sender is dishonest, then either all honest agents abort the protocol,
or all honest agents decide on the same output value y ∈ D.
We say that a HBA protocol is p-resilient, where 0 < p < 1, if the protocol
still works when less than a fraction of p receivers are dishonest. The quantum
honest-success Byzantine agreement (QHBA) protocol that we will present in
this section is m−2
m
–resilient, where m is the number of receivers. Our protocol
is much more efficient than classical BA protocol in the presence of a large
number of cheating nodes.
There are three phases of our QHBA protocol. The aim of the first phase is
to distribute a set of correlated lists among agents. In the second phase, some
special correlated lists are generated based on the set of correlated lists. Then
in the third phase, agents use the special correlated lists to achieve consensus.
3.1 List distribution by quantum secure direct communication
Unlike quantum key distribution, which only allows to distribute non-deterministic
message, quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) [13,27,28] allows
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messages to be deterministically sent through the quantum channel. We use
QSDC to distribute those correlated lists. Our QSDC protocol is based on a
quantum version of Shamir’s three-pass protocol [35]. A classical scenario of
the three-pass protocol is the following 2
– Alice’s friend Bob lives in a repressive country where the police spy on
everything and open all the mails.
– Alice needs to send a valuable object to Bob.
– Alice has a strongbox with a hasp big enough for several locks, but no lock
to which Bob also has a key.
How can Alice get the item to Bob securely? Alice and Bob might take the
following three pass protocol:
1. Put the item into the box, attach Alice’s lock to the hasp, and mail the
box to Bob.
2. Bob adds his own lock and mails the box back to Alice.
3. Alice removes her lock and mails the box back to Bob. Bob now removes
his lock and opens the box.
In a previous paper [35], we have introduced a quantum realization of the
three-pass protocol for key distribution. It turns out that this protocol can
be straightforwardly used for secure direct communication. Now we recap the
quantum three-pass protocol in [35].
We use qubit |0〉 and |1〉 to encode 0 and 1 respectively. Our key space
for encryption and decryption contains 4 X-gates {X(0), X(pi
2
), X(pi), X(3pi
2
)},
where X(m) = |+〉〈+|+emi|−〉〈−|. The encryption of a qubit |i〉 with key k is
defined as Enck(i) = k|i〉, and the decryption of a qubit |i〉 is Deck(i) = k|i〉,
where k ∈ {X(0), X(pi
2
), X(pi), X(3pi
2
)}. We let (X(m), X(m) = X(2pi − m))
be a pair of encryption/decryption keys.
Figure 1 is our quantum three-pass protocol for a sender (agent 1) to send
a sequence of bits to a receiver (agent 2). At the beginning of the protocol,
agent 1 encrypts the bit string element-wise and sends the resulting string to
agent 2. Then agent 2 encrypts the ciphertext and sends the result back to
agent 1. Agent 1 then decrypts the string and sends it to agent 2. Now agent
2 decrypts the string and gets the key.
Now we use our quantum three-pass protocol to distribute correlated lists.
Let {P1, . . . , Pn, Pn+1, . . . , Pn+d} be the set of agents. We let P1 be the sender
of the QHBA protocol, P2, . . . , Pn be receivers and Pn+1, . . . , Pn+d be list
distributors who are in charge of distributing lists of correlated numbers. For
every agent Pi ∈ {Pn+1, . . . , Pn+d}, the task of Pi is to use the quantum three-
pass protocol to send a list of numbers Lik to agent Pk ∈ {P1, . . . , Pn} such
that the following is satisfied:
1. For all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, |Lik| = m for some integer m which is a multiple of
6.
2 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-pass_protocol
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Protocol for key distribution
Input: a string of binary numbers (a1, . . . , an).
Agent 1 has a private key (k11, . . . k
1
n). Agent 2 has a private key (k
2
1 , . . . k
2
n).
1. Agent 1: Encrypt.
Produce (b1, . . . , bn), such that bi = Enck1
i
(ai).
Send the list (b1, . . . , bn) to Agent 2.
2. Agent 2: Encrypt.
Let ci = Enck2
i
(bi), for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Send the list (c1, . . . , cn) to Agent 1.
3. Agent 1: Decrypt.
Let di = Dec
k1
i
(ci). for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Send the list (d1, . . . , dn) to Agent 2.
4. Agent 2: Decrypt.
Let ei = Dec
k
2
i
(di). Then ei = ai.
Fig. 1: A quantum three-pass protocol for secure direct communication
2. Li1 ∈ {0, 1, 2}
m. m
3
numbers on Li1 are 0.
m
3
numbers on Li1 are 1.
m
3
numbers on Li1 are 2.
3. For all k ∈ {2, . . . , n}, Lik ∈ {0, 1}
m.
4. For all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, if Li1[j] = 0, then L
i
2[j] = . . . = L
i
n[j] = 0.
5. For all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, if Li1[j] = 1, then L
i
2[j] = . . . = L
i
n[j] = 1.
6. For all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, if Li1[j] = 2, then for all k ∈ {2, . . . , n} the proba-
bility of Lik[j] = 0 and L
i
k[j] = 1 are equal.
After those lists are selected3, P2, . . . Pn are entitled to communicate with
P1 to check whether those lists satisfy the above specification. If for some pa-
rameter θ ∈ [0, 1
2
], more than θn agents report that the lists distributed by Pi
do not satisfy the specification. The Pi is classified as a corrupted/dishonest
distributor. To stimulate Pi to play honestly, honest distributors will be re-
warded by some qulogicoins while those corrupted distributors will not.
3.2 List formation by sequential composition
In this phase, {P1, . . . , Pn} use a simply sequential composition procedure to
form a unique list to be used in the next phase.
Assume there are h list distributors who are classified to be honest. Without
loss of generality, the lists distributed by those distributors Pn+1, . . . , Pn+h can
be represented by Ln+1 = (Ln+11 , . . . , L
n+1
n ), . . . ,L
n+h = (Ln+h1 , . . . , L
n+h
n ).
The aim of this phase is to form a new sequence of lists L = (L1, . . . , Ln), which
3 Some additional decoy qubits may be sent and revealed to detect eavesdroppers.
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is to be used in the next phase. We construct L by the sequential composition of
L
n+1, . . . ,Ln+h. That is, we let L1 = L
n+1
1 . . . L
n+h
1 , . . . , Ln = L
n+1
n . . . L
n+h
n .
On average, every honest distributor contributes 1
h
to the final lists L.
This property is crucial to counteract the attack of some adversary who tries
to bribe the distributor. We will briefly discuss this attack in Section 3.4. This
mechanism together with the mechanism of reward will encourage more dis-
tributors to behave honestly. On the other hand, the more honest distributors
there are, the more reliable is our blockchain.
3.3 Achieving consensus
After the correlated lists L = (L1, . . . , Ln) are established, the agents P1, . . . , Pn,
of which we assume at least a half of them are honest, run the following steps
to achieve consensus.
1. P1 sends a binary number b1,k to all Pk, k ∈ {2, . . . , n}. Together with b1,k,
P1 sends a list of numbers ID1,k, which indicates all positions on L1 where
b1,k appears, to Pk. The length of ID1,k is required to be
m
3
, where m is
the length of L1. If P1 is honest, then he will send the same message to
all agents, i.e. (b1,k, ID1,k) = (b1,j, ID1,j) for all j, k ∈ {2, . . . , n}. If P1 is
dishonest, then he will send different binary numbers and different lists of
numbers to different agents, i.e. (b1,k, ID1,k) 6= (b1,j , ID1,j) for some j, k.
An honest P1 will also use b1,k as the final value it outputs, while a dishonest
P1 will use b1,k or 1− b1,k randomly as its final output value.
2. Agent Pk analyzes the obtained message (b1,k, ID1,k) with his own list Lk.
If the analysis of Pk shows that (b1,k, ID1,k) is consistent with Lk, then if Pk
is honest, he sends (b1,k, ID1,k) to all other agents Pj 6=1. Here (b1,k, ID1,k)
is consistent with Lk means that for all index x ∈ ID1,k, Lk[x] = b1,k.
However, if (bk,j , IDk,j) is not consistent with Lk, then Pk immediately
ascertains that P1 is dishonest and sends ⊥ to other agents, meaning that
“I have received inconsistent message”. A dishonest Pk sends 1− b1,k with
whatever indexes he chooses or simply ⊥. The full information which Pj
receives from Pk will be denoted by (bk,j , IDk,j).
3. After all messages have been exchanged between P2, . . . , Pn, every honest
agent Pk considers the received data and acts according to the following
criterion:
(a) If there is a set of agents H with |H | ≥ 2 such that
i. for all j ∈ H , (bj,k, IDj,k) is consistent with Lk, and
ii. for some i, j ∈ H , bi,k 6= bj,k,
then Pk sets his output value to be ⊥.
(b) If there is a set of agents H with |H | ≥ 2 such that for all j ∈ H ,
(bj,k, IDj,k) is consistent with Lk and all bj,k are the same, and for all
i 6∈ H , (bi,k, IDi,k) is not consistent with Lk, then H is the set of all
honest agents and Pk sets his output value vk = bj,k.
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(c) If there is a set of agents H with |H | ≥ 2 such that for all j ∈ H ,
(bj,k, IDj,k) is consistent with Lk and all bj,k are the same, and for all
i 6∈ H , the message sent by Pi is ⊥, then Pk set vk = bj,k.
(d) In all other cases, Pk sets his value to be ⊥.
4. We say that consesus is achieved if at least n
2
agents output the same bit
value v ∈ {0, 1}. In this case, those agents whose output is the same as v
are rewarded with some qulogicoins.
Now we briefly explain the rationale of these criterion. Suppose Pj is a
dishonest receiver, where j ≥ 2. Now Pj wants to send (bj,k, IDj,k) to Pk such
that (bj,k, IDj,k) is consistent with Lk. Note that on Lj , there are
m
2
positions
on which bj,k appears. But on L1, there are only
m
3
positions on which bj,k
appears. Therefore, there are m
2
− m
3
= m
6
positions on which there are some
discord. But Pj has no knowledge about those discord. We say a position x is a
discord position iff L1[x] = 2. If Pj selects a discord position x and put it into
IDj,k, then with probability
1
2
it will be that Lk[x] 6= bj,k. Therefore, to ensure
that (bj,k, IDj,k) is consistent with Lk, Pj has to avoid all discord positions.
The probability of avoiding all discord positions is (2
3
)
m
3 , which is extremely
small when m is relatively large. Therefore, if it happens that (bj,k, IDj,k)
is consistent with Lk, then Pk can conclude that Pj is honest. For the same
reason Pk can conclude that Pi is honest when (bi,k, IDi,k) is consistent with
Lk. Now, if in addition that bi,k 6= bj,k, Pk can safely conclude that P1 is
dishonest. This is the rationale of criterion (a).
The rationale of criterion (b) is essentially the same as the rationale of
criterion (a). In this case, P1 ∈ H and those agents who are not in H are
dishonest agents and they failed on cheating.
The rationale of criterion (c) is also essentially the same as the rationale of
criterion (a). In this case some agents who are not in H is also honest. They
will change their output value from ⊥ to bj,k.
3.4 Some potential attacks
Now we briefly discuss some potential attacks to our blockchain.
3.4.1 Double-spending adversary
Our blockchain is resistant to a double-spending adversary. A double spending
adversary can simply be modeled by a dishonest sender P1 who sends 0 to some
nodes and 1 to some other nodes. This kind of attack will not work according
to criterion (a).
3.4.2 Tampering adversary
Our blockchain is also resistant to a tampering adversary. We model a tamper-
ing adversary by an arbitrary set of dishonest receivers, of which the cardinality
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is less then n
2
. A dishonest receiver Pi maliciously sends 1− b1,i, together with
some indexes, to all other agents. This kind of adversary will not be successful
according to criterion (b) and (c), as long as there are still 2 honest receivers.
3.4.3 Bribe the distributor
Every honest list distributor has some knowledge about the list L = (L1, . . . , Ln).
Some adversary may bribe list distributors to obtain some valuable knowledge
about L. But this attack is costly for the adversary, because he has to bribe
many list distributors to obtain sufficient knowledge.
4 Application in quantum bit commitment
Now we apply our QLB to the design of quantum bit commitment proto-
cols. Bit commitment, used in a wide range of cryptographic protocols (e.g.
zero-knowledge proof, multiparty secure computation, and oblivious transfer),
typically consists of two phases, namely: commitment and opening. In the
commitment phase, Alice the sender chooses a bit a (a = 0 or 1) which she
wishes to commit to the receiver Bob. Then Alice presents Bob some evidence
about the bit. The committed bit cannot be known by Bob prior to the open-
ing phase. Later, in the opening phase, Alice announces some information for
reconstructing a. Bob then reconstructs a bit a′ using Alice’s evidence and
announcement. A correct bit commitment protocol will ensure that a′ = a.
A bit commitment protocol is concealing if Bob cannot know the bit Alice
committed before the opening phase and it is binding if Alice cannot change
the bit she committed after the commitment phase.
The first quantum bit commitment (QBC) protocol is proposed by Ben-
nett and Brassard in 1984 [8]. A QBC protocol is unconditionally secure if
any cheating can be detected with a probability arbitrarily close to 1. Here,
Alice’s cheating means that Alice changes the committed bit after the com-
mit phase, while Bob’s cheating means that Bob learns the committed bit
before the opening phase. A number of QBC protocols are designed to achieve
unconditional security, such as those of [10,11]. However, according to the
Mayers-Lo-Chau (MLC) no-go theorem [25,24], unconditionally secure QBC
can never be achieved in principle.
Although unconditional secure QBC is impossible, several QBC protocols
satisfy some other notions of security, such as cheat-sensitive quantum bit com-
mitment (CSQBC) protocols [16,12,30,23,34] and relativistic QBC protocols
[18,1]. In CSQBC protocols, the probability for detecting cheating is merely
required to be non-zero. With this less stringent security requirement, many
QBC protocols which are not unconditional secure are regarded as secure in
the cheat-sensitive sense.
However, for any CSQBC to work, there has to be a mechanism of enforcing
punishment when a cheating behavior is detected. Otherwise both Alice and
Bob will always cheat, regardless of whether it will be detected. Therefore the
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protocol will either be aborted or end with someone cheats successfully. So far
this problem (enforcing punishment in CSQBC) is completely omitted in the
literature. In this section, we solve this problem by applying QLB to enforce
punishment.4
4.1 A cheat-sensitive quantum bit commitment protocol
For the sake of concreteness, we present a CSQBC protocol taken from a
recent paper of ours [31] and demonstrate how to enforce punishment for this
protocol by using QLB. There are three phases of this protocol, namely: the
preparation phase, the commitment phase and the opening phase.
The preparation phase contains the following steps:
1. Bob generates a sequence of n qubits such that
(a) n is a multiple of 4.
(b) n
4
qubits are |0〉, n
4
qubits are X(pi
2
)|0〉 = |i〉, n
4
qubits are X |0〉 = |1〉,
and n
4
qubits are X(3pi
2
)|0〉 = |i〉.
(c) for every j ∈ {1, . . . , n
2
}, the 2j−1th qubit and the 2jth qubit are from
different ONBs.
Such a sequence is called a balanced-uniform sequence. Bob generates m
balanced-uniform sequences and sends them to Alice.
2. Alice chooses m − 1 sequences and asks Bob to reveal, qubit by qubit,
which state it was prepared. Then, Alice measures those qubits in the
appropriate basis to verify whether Bob has prepared those qubits in the
required specification: the {|0〉, |1〉} basis for qubits |0〉 and |1〉 and the
{|i〉, |i〉} basis for qubits |i〉 and |i〉. If Alice detects that Bob has prepared
a sequence that is not balanced-uniform, then Alice has detected Bob’s
cheating.
The commitment phase contains the following steps:
1. Alice commits 2 bits by applying quantum operations to the only balanced-
uniform sequence left. We denote this sequence as QS. If Alice decides to
commit 00/01/10/11, then he/she applies X(0)/X(pi
2
)/X(pi)/X(3pi
2
) to all
qubits in QS, respectively. Then, Alice generates a classical string CS of
length n
2
. Alice applies the SWAP operator to QS[2j − 1] and QS[2j] iff
CS[j] = 1. Alice sends QS to Bob.
2. Bob measures each received qubit either in the {|0〉, |1〉} basis or in the
{|i〉, |i〉} basis which is chosen uniformly at random.
The opening phase contains the following steps:
1. Alice reveals CS.
4 While the Bitcoin blockchain has been applied to solve a related problem in classical bit
commitment [2], the solution seems to be inadequate for quantum bit commitment because
there is no quantum data in the Bitcoin blockchain.
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2. Based on the information of CS, Bob is able to know the original state of
each position in QS, because it is Bob who prepared QS and now he knows
how it was swapped. Now Bob determines whether it was measured in the
correct basis for each position in QS: for a position that was originally
occupied by |0〉 or |1〉, the correct basis is the {|0〉, |1〉} basis, for other
qubits the correct basis is the other basis. Now, Bob can reconstruct the
bits committed by Alice as follows:
(a) If Alice committed to 00, then all the qubits measured in the correct
basis must yield a state which is the same as the original one.
(b) If Alice committed to 10, then all the qubits measured in the correct
basis must yield a state which can be recovered to the original one by
applying a X(pi) gate afterwrds.
(c) If Alice committed to 01, then all the qubits measured in the incorrect
basis must yield a state which can be recovered to the original one by
applying a X(3pi
2
) gate afterwrds.
(d) If Alice committed to 11, then all the qubits measured in the incorrect
basis must yield a state which can be recovered to the original one by
applying a X(pi
2
) gate afterwrds.
All other cases are classified as Alice’s cheating.
4.2 Enforce punishment by QLB
To enforce punishment for Bob when he cheats, we require Bob to create the
following protected transaction on QLB. “Bob sends n qulogicoins, which he
has received from another transaction Ty, to Bob; The qulogicoins transferred
in this transaction can only be used when the following is true:
– Alice discover that all sequence prepared by Bob are balanced-uniform.
Or equivalently, Alice does not discover Bob’s cheating in the preparation
phase.”
To enforce punishment for Alice when she cheats, we require Alice to cre-
ate the following protected transaction on QLB. “Alice sends n qulogicoins,
which she has received from another transaction Ty, to Alice; The qulogicoins
transferred in this transaction can only be used when the following is true:
– Bob does not discover Alice’s cheating in the opening phase. Or equiva-
lently, one of the following is true:
1. All the qubits measured in the correct basis yield a state which is the
same as the original one.
2. All the qubits measured in the correct basis yield a state which can be
recovered to the original one by applying a X(pi) gate.
3. All the qubits measured in the incorrect basis yield a state which can
be recovered to the original one by applying a X(3pi
2
) gate.
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4. All the qubits measured in the incorrect basis yield a state which can
be recovered to the original one by applying a X(pi
2
) gate.”5
5 Conclusion and future work
In this paper we introduced quantum-enhanced logic-based blockchain to im-
prove the efficiency and power of quantum-secured blockchain [19]. The effi-
ciency is improved by using a new quantum honest-success Byzantine agree-
ment protocol to replace the classical Byzantine agreement protocol in quantum-
secured blockchain, while the power is improved by incorporating quantum
certificate and quantum protection into the syntax of transactions. No multi-
particle entanglement is used in our blockchain, which makes it easy to be
implemented with the current technology. In fact, all the quantum technology
needed for our blockchain is already available in laboratories and even indus-
try. Incorporating quantum certificate and quantum protection into blockchain
makes it possible to use our blockchain to overcome a significant shortcoming
of cheat-sensitive quantum bit commitment protocols.
In the future, we will further extend QLB to make it smarter and easier-
to-regulate. We are also interested in applying QLB in other tasks such as
electronic voting, online auction and multiparty lotteries.
5 Although these quantum protections is expressed informally in this paper, they can be
expressed concisely and precisely by some quantum logic, such as the the dynamic logic of
quantum programs [4,5,6,3,9]. We leave this as future work.
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